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Abstract – Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support
the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which
punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative mechanisms, including partner switch-
ing. In this study, we investigate the combined effect of punishment and partner switching in
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games conducted on a network. In the model, agents are located
on the network and participate in the prisoner’s dilemma games with punishment. In addition,
they can opportunistically switch interaction partners to improve their payoff. Our Monte Carlo
simulation showed that a large frequency of punishers is required to suppress defectors when the
frequency of partner switching is low. In contrast, cooperation is the most abundant strategy when
the frequency of partner switching is high regardless of the strength of punishment. Interestingly,
cooperators become abundant not because they avoid the cost of inflicting punishment and earn
a larger average payoff per game but rather because they have more numerous opportunities to
be referred as a role agent by defectors. Our results imply that the fluidity of social relationships
has a profound effect on the adopted strategy in maintaining cooperation.
Introduction. – The evolution of cooperation is an
actively studied subject in the biological and physical sci-
ences [1–3]. Social efficiency can be enhanced if each in-
dividual pays the cost of cooperation in helping other in-
dividuals. However, individuals can maximise their own
benefit by enjoying the fruits of others’ cooperative be-
haviour without paying the cost of cooperation. This
temptation to free-ride on the cooperation of others makes
cooperation vulnerable against defectors. The tension be-
tween social efficiency and individual welfare is called ‘so-
cial dilemma’ and is analysed within the framework of
(evolutionary) game theory.
Many theoretical models have been proposed to under-
stand ways in which the discrepancy between individual
and group benefits is resolved and to explain the evolution-
ary origin of cooperation. Proposed mechanisms include
direct reciprocity [4], indirect reciprocity [5], voluntary
participation [6], tag-based cooperation [7] and network
structure [8, 9], among several others.
In this paper, we examined the combined effect of
two mechanisms adopted in the previous literature–
punishment and partner switching. Punishment is an
additional strategy that is appended to standard social
dilemma games, the strategies of which are limited to co-
operation or defection (free-riding). Punishers not only
pay the cost of cooperation but also incur a cost in pun-
ishing defectors. Experimental studies have shown that
appending a punishment strategy enhances the level of
cooperation [10]. This observation raises another evolu-
tionary puzzle because there are no incentives for each
individual to bear the cost of punishment. Cooperators in
particular are called second-order free-riders because they
only incur the cost of cooperation and avoid the burden
of imposing punishment [11]. Researchers have explained
the evolution of punishment by referring to group selection
[12], reputation [13, 14], and spatial interaction [15–22].
Despite its importance, punishment is not always the
dominant solution in solving the social dilemma problem
when other options are available [23]. Field research of
human behaviour has indicated that the severing of so-
cial ties with free-riders is more widely observed than the
costly imposition of punishment [24]. The effects of the
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modifications of social relationships have been studied ex-
tensively under the framework of the co-evolutionary game
[25]. Models of the evolutionary games on the (social)
network assume that agents are located on the network
and that game interactions occur with neighbours who
are connected by links [8, 9]. Co-evolutionary game mod-
els consider the possibility that agents sever the links with
current neighbours and construct new links on the basis of
the strategy and payoff from the games in which they have
participated [26–45]. Many of these models showed that
sufficient opportunities for link adaptation can foster the
evolution of cooperation. Human experiments also showed
that opportunities for partner switching induce higher co-
operation levels [46–48]. The co-evolutionary framework
is applied to other social phenomena, including consensus
formation [49] and the evolution of fairness [50–52].
Here we introduce the partner switching mechanism
and punishment strategy to the prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG) on a network. By conducting Monte Carlo ex-
periments we showed that punishers can repress defectors
without partner switching if the strength of the punish-
ment is high. In contrast, cooperation is the most abun-
dant strategy when the frequency of link adaptation is
high regardless of the strength of the punishment. No-
tably, a high frequency of cooperators is achieved with-
out their gaining a higher average payoff per game than
that gained by punishers. Our simulation outcomes–to
be shown in detail shortly–imply that the distinction be-
tween punishers and second-order free-riders is blurred in
the co-evolutionary PDG.
In what follows, we first explain the PDG with network
evolution and punishment. Then, we present the results
of the simulation. In the last section, we discuss the im-
plications of our results.
Model. – In the standard version of the PDG, agents
have two strategies: cooperation (C) and defection (D).
Cooperators incur a cost in helping other agents, while de-
fectors do not. The burden of the cooperation cost leads
to the cooperators being at a payoff disadvantage in com-
parison with defectors, and cooperators become extinct
without the support of additional mechanisms. In this
study, we use the extended version of the PDG that in-
cludes the punishment (P ) strategy. Punishers pay the
cost of cooperation in the same manner that cooperators
do. In addition, after observing the partner’s choice (C or
D), punishers incur the cost of sanction (γ) to apply a fine
(α) to defectors. Using the rescaled payoff matrix [8] and
appending the punishment strategy, the payoff matrix of
a studied game is given by [19]:


C D P
C 1 0 1
D b 0 b− α
P 1 −γ 1

, (1)
where b is the temptation to defect (1 < b < 2). Cooper-
ators are called second-order free-riders because they do
not incur the cost of punishment.
Next, we explain the evolutionary process of the strat-
egy and network structure within which the game is
played. We consider a set of N agents who are placed
on the network. Links between nodes (agents) represent
social relationships (game interactions) existing between
two agents. Initially, agents are located on a homoge-
neous network (average degree 〈k〉 , degree heterogeneity
appears after link adaptation), where each agent’s neigh-
bour is randomly decided [53]. Each agent’s strategy is
uniformly distributed.
The Monte Carlo simulation consists of two kinds of
events: strategy updating events and partner switching
events. Strategy updating events occur with the proba-
bility 1− w. In strategy updating events, one link is cho-
sen randomly [33], and the roles of two connected agents
(focal or role) are also determined randomly. The focal
agent may imitate the role agent’s strategy on the basis
of the comparison of payoffs from games. In particular,
each agent participates in PDG with punishment with all
the neighbours and accumulates payoffs. Next, the payoffs
are compared and the focal agent imitates the strategy of
the role agent with a probability derived by the following
equation:
P (sf → sr) = [1 + exp(−β(Πr −Πf ))]
−1,
where Πf (Πr) denotes the accumulated payoff of the focal
(role) agent. The β is the intensity of selection (β → 0
implies the random adoption of a strategy, whereas β →
∞ implies the deterministic imitation). In the following
analysis, we set the value of β to 0.1, which implies that
agents tend to adopt a strategy that results in a higher
payoff, but the possibility of ‘irrational’ imitation is also
allowed. We assume that with probability µ, mutation
occurs in strategy updating events and that a randomly
selected agent from the population adopts one strategy
uniformly [17]. The possibility of mutation ensures that
the resultant distribution of strategies is robust against
small perturbations.
Partner switching (link adaptation) events occur with
the probability w, and one randomly chosen focal agent
may cut a relationship with one randomly selected cur-
rent neighbour and construct a relationship with one ran-
domly selected non-neighbour. Following standard liter-
ature [25], we assume that agents modify social relation-
ships on the basis of the strategy that other agents adopt.
In particular, the focal agent severs the link with one ran-
domly selected current neighbour and reconnects that link
with one randomly selected non-neighbour (potential new
neighbour) if the rewiring realises the strict improvement
in payoff (combinations of strategies that result in link
adaptation are shown in Table 1; see also payoff matrix
(1)). In this regard, agents depend on local knowledge
(information on neighbours’ strategies) as well as reputa-
tional knowledge (information on non-neighbours’ strate-
gies) [47].
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Table 1: The combinations of the strategy of a focal agent, a
randomly selected current neighbour and a randomly selected
potential new neighbour (current non-neighbour) that lead to
link adaptation are shown. Link adaptation does not occur in
other cases because payoff improvement is not achieved.
The strategy of a
focal agent neighbour potential new neighbour
C D C, P
D D C, P (if b− α > 0)
C (if b − α < 0)
D P C (if b − α > 0)
C, D (if b− α < 0)
P D C, P
In link adaptation events, for example, a focal coopera-
tor (punisher) switches partners when a selected neighbour
is a defector and a selected non-neighbour is a coopera-
tor or a punisher because an interaction with this player
(a new neighbour) results in a larger payoff. This is the
same for a focal defector if we assume that the fine of pun-
ishment is not large enough for a focal defector to prefer
defectors over punishers in game interactions (b− α > 0).
In addition, a defector can sever the partnership with a
punisher and establish a link with a cooperator. In con-
trast, when the fine of punishment is large (b − α < 0),
defectors prefer cooperators over defectors and defectors
over punishers and modify partnerships accordingly. Part-
ner switching does not occur in other cases because the
link rewiring lowers the payoff or does not change the sit-
uation. We call this link adaptation rule ‘opportunistic
partner switching’ because agents seek to improve their
gain by finding more beneficial interactions. We report
mainly the results with b − α > 0 because the basic re-
sult is the same in either case. We briefly mention the
case where b − α < 0 at the end of the Results section
and explain why both cases reach similar results. In the
simulation, we imposed the restriction that the link to an
agent who has only one neighbour may not be severed so
that all agents can participate in the PDG [29].
Results. – To investigate the results of the evolution-
ary process, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations. The
simulation continued for 10000 × N periods in the first
place, and we averaged the values of following 20000×N
periods to calculate the quantities of interest. Our main
interest is in the frequency of each strategy (ρC , ρD and
ρP ). We report the average of five independent simula-
tions for each combination of parameters to enhance sta-
tistical accuracy. Because the model includes many pa-
rameters, supplementary material reports the results with
different values of parameters and checks the robustness
of the patterns explained below.
First, in providing an overview of the basic results of
the simulation, we report the frequency of cooperative in-
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Fig. 1: Sum of the proportion of cooperators and punish-
ers (ρC + ρP ) as a function of the temptation to defect
(b). Both harsher punishment and higher frequency of part-
ner switching help cooperators and punishers. Parameters:
N = 50000, 〈k〉 = 8, γ = 0.05, β = 0.1, µ = 0.005.
dividuals (ρC + ρP ) as a function of the temptation to
defect (b). Figure 1 shows that cooperation deteriorates
with small b when partner switching is slow (w = 0.1)
and the punishment fine is small (α = 0.1). Defectors
who exploit cooperators and punishers to achieve a larger
payoff can proliferate in the population. The figure also
shows that both partner switching and harsh punishment
can help cooperative agents. A more gradual decrease of
cooperators and punishers is observed with harsher pun-
ishment (α = 0.5), and cooperative agents flourish with
larger values of b. Faster partner switching (w = 0.7) also
helps cooperators and punishers: they predominate over
defectors with larger b until a discontinuous drop was ob-
served.
To elaborate the effects of partner switching and pun-
ishment, we report ρC and ρP as a function of w for dif-
ferent values of α in fig. 2. Panel (a) shows the result
of harsh punishment (α = 0.51), and only the existence
of a strong punisher is sufficient to outperform defectors.
Defectors are suppressed without fast partner switching
(small w). In this situation, a certain number of punishers
is required because cooperators cannot resist the invasion
by mutant defectors. Defectors acquire higher payoff in
each game and cooperators diminish their frequency with-
out the support of punishers. The panel also shows that
the frequency of cooperators increases as the value of w
becomes larger. Panel (b) shows the results of weak pun-
ishment (α = 0.17), and defectors proliferate when w is
small. However, a discontinuous increase in ρC and ρP is
observed as w exceeds the specific value. In addition, the
cooperator is the winner of the evolutionary process in this
phase, and the frequency of cooperators is larger than that
of punishers. The frequency of cooperators is about twice
that of punishers with this combination of parameters.
To provide the comprehensive explanation of the pat-
terns that were observed in fig. 2, we report ρC and ρP
in the w − α space in fig. 3. When w is small evolution-
ary outcomes are dependent on the strength of punish-
ment: larger α is required for the evolution of coopera-
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(a) α = 0.51
(b) α = 0.17
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Fig. 2: Proportion of cooperators and punishers (ρC and ρP )
as a function of the frequency of partner switching (w). Panel
(a) shows that only strong punishment is sufficient to suppress
defectors. Panel (b) shows that fast link adaptation can also
help cooperators and punishers even with weak punishment.
Cooperators increases in frequency when w is large regardless
of the value of α. Parameters: (a) α = 0.51, (b) α = 0.17; fixed
N = 50000, 〈k〉 = 8, b = 1.15, γ = 0.05, β = 0.1, µ = 0.005.
tion and punishment. Note that the required efficiency
of punishment (α/γ) depends on the cost of punishment
(γ). In fig. 3, relatively efficient punishment (γ = 0.05 and
α ≈ 0.35) is required for the evolution of cooperators and
punishers. In contrast, we confirmed that, when γ is large
(γ = 0.30), relatively less efficient punishment (α = 0.88)
is sufficient to repress defectors without partner switching.
When w is sufficiently large, defectors diminish in fre-
quency regardless of the size of α. This result is not sur-
prising because many previous studies have shown that
fast partner switching can support the evolution of coop-
eration without punishment. The novel finding here is that
the winners of the evolutionary process in this situation
are cooperators.
The result indicating that cooperators outperform pun-
ishers when the frequency of partner switching is high
may seem to be a natural one because cooperators are
second-order free-riders, and they do not incur the cost
of punishment. However, the mechanism that supports
the proliferation of cooperation is more intricate. To un-
derstand the evolutionary process, we first compute the
average payoff per game for each strategy (piC , piD, piP )
and report the time-series of their differences (piC−piD and
piC−piP ) in fig. 4. The figure shows that cooperators earn a
larger payoff than do defectors. Although defectors earn a
larger payoff by free-riding at the outset of the simulation,
this advantage deteriorates rapidly. Previous studies have
pointed out that an assortment of cooperators is the key
to the success of the cooperators in evolutionary games on
the network and that the assortment is helped by partner
switching because cooperators can sever the relationships
with defectors [31].
The figure also shows that cooperators earn a larger
payoff than punishers during the early stages of the sim-
ulation process. Because only punishers incur the cost
of punishment, second-order free-riders (that is, cooper-
ators) acquire larger payoff. However, the advantage for
cooperators disappears quickly, and they earn a smaller
payoff than punishers. (This situation does not appear in
(a) ρC (b) ρP
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Fig. 3: Panel (a) shows the proportion of cooperators (ρC)
and Panel (b) shows the proportion of punishers (ρP ) as a
function of (w,α). Strong punishment is required to suppress
defectors when w is small. Cooperation is the most abundant
strategy when w is large. Parameters: N = 50000, 〈k〉 = 8, b =
1.15, γ = 0.05, β = 0.1, µ = 0.005.
the case of well-mixed populations where punishers gain
a smaller average payoff than do cooperators as long as
defectors exist.)
This disadvantage for cooperators is the result of the
opportunistic link adaptation mechanism. To achieve a
larger payoff by avoiding the fine of punishment, defectors
sever their relationships with punishers and create new
links with cooperators. Consequently, punishers can avoid
the burden of interactions with defectors although they
earn a smaller payoff than cooperators once they partic-
ipate in interactions with defectors. The co-evolutionary
process thus improves the total payoff as well as average
payoff per game of punishers. In addition, although coop-
erators do not suffer from decreases in total payoff due to
partnerships with defectors, link adaptation leads to the
transfer of the risk of invasion by defectors to coopera-
tors. The partner switching mechanism thus changes the
situations where cooperators just free-ride on punishers.
Paradoxically, links with defectors support the evolu-
tionary success of cooperators. Because defectors’ rela-
tionships with cooperators and punishers are severed, they
suffer from a lower average payoff per game, as well as a
smaller number of games in which they can participate
(as we see below, only fast partner switching is sufficient
to suppress the proliferation of defectors). Consequently,
the combination of link adaptation and punishment (or
very fast link adaptation alone) helps cooperators and
punishers to earn a larger payoff than defectors and facili-
tates transitions from defection to cooperation or punish-
ment. However, cooperators enjoy the larger benefit from
this transition. We counted the number of times defec-
tors adopt cooperation (nD→C) and punishment (nD→P )
and report the time-series of their ratio (nD→C/nD→P )
in fig. 5. The figure shows that the number of transitions
from defectors to cooperators is larger than that from de-
fectors to punishers. The advantage for cooperators is
prominent even if we consider the ratio of strategy fre-
quency (ρC/ρP ) that is also plotted in fig. 5. Although
more cooperators than punishers adopt a defective strat-
egy, the larger number of relationships with defectors leads
p-4
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Fig. 4: Payoff difference (piC − piD and piC − piP ) as a function
of time. We calculated the mean values for every N period.
Payoff for cooperators exceeds that of defectors in the early
rounds of the simulation. In contrast, the advantages for co-
operators over punishers disappear at the early stages of the
simulation. Figure 4 and 5 report the average of 200 simulation
runs. Parameters: N = 50000, 〈k〉 = 8, b = 1.15, γ = 0.05, α =
0.17, w = 0.4, β = 0.1, µ = 0.005.
to the proliferation of cooperators because the absolute
number of transitions to cooperator is larger than that of
transitions to defector.
This advantage for cooperators stems from the fact that
partnership with defectors supports cooperators by secur-
ing larger opportunities to enforce their strategy on defec-
tors. Because defectors sever their relationships with pun-
ishers, defectors and punishers tend to be segregated and
strategy transmission between these two types of agents
becomes rare. In contrast, since those with severed links to
punishers are connected to cooperators, cooperators have
a greater number of opportunities to be referred to as a
role agent and for their strategies to be copied by defec-
tors. These patterns are verified by the ratio of nD−C to
nD−P . Here, nD−C (nD−P ) denotes the number of times
that strategy updating events between a focal defector and
a role cooperator (punisher) occured. As shown in fig. 5,
strategy updating events between focal defectors and role
cooperators occur more frequently and cooperators have
larger opportunities to enforce their strategy. Once the
payoff dominance over defectors is achieved, a link with
defectors brings cooperators the opportunities of prolifer-
ation rather than the risk of invasion.
In addition, connection with defectors is beneficial for
cooperators regarding the number of games in which they
can participate. In the short term, interactions with defec-
tors result in zero payoff and are not immediately benefi-
cial for cooperators. However, once defectors turn into
cooperators, cooperators can enjoy the positive payoff
from a larger number of games, which also helps coop-
erators to effectively enforce their strategy on defectors.
Figure 5 shows that nD→C/nD→P is slightly larger than
nD−C/nD−P , which implies that cooperators who earn a
larger payoff exploit the opportunities of strategy enforce-
ment more effectively.
We confirmed that the same pattern is observed when α
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Fig. 5: The ratio of the number of times defectors adopt co-
operation (nD→C) to the number of times defectors adopt
punishment (nD→P ) as a function of time. We calculated
the mean values for every N period. Cooperators are more
likely to enforce their strategy on punishers. Parameters:
N = 50000, 〈k〉 = 8, b = 1.15, γ = 0.05, α = 0.17, w = 0.4, β =
0.1, µ = 0.005.
is large although the result is not reported here. Because
harsh punishment diminishes the number of defectors, the
effective frequency of link adaptation is lowered. How-
ever, the advantage of being imitated by defectors more
frequently is achieved when w is large enough and coop-
erators proliferate as we observed in figs. 2 and 3.
To confirm the robustness of the result that fast link
adaptation supports the dominance of cooperators, we in-
vestigate cases where the cost of punishment (γ) is small.
Note that for the enhancement of comparability, we as-
sume that partner switching is implemented in the same
manner (i.e. link adaptation occurs as if α > 0) although
we often examine cases where α = 0 and defectors gain
same payoff from interactions with cooperators and pun-
ishers. Figure 6 reports the proportion of each strat-
egy as a function of α for different values of γ. First,
the figure shows that fast partner switching can diminish
the frequency of defectors without substantive punishment
(α = 0), which implies that only large w excludes the
defection of candidates from winning strategies. Second,
panel (a) shows that frequency of cooperators is larger
than that of punishers when γ = 0. This result corrob-
orates the interpretation that the cost of implementing
punishment is not the main reason for the predominance
of cooperators. Third, larger α contributes to the grad-
ual decrease in the number of defectors and mitigates the
disadvantage of punishers relative to cooperators because
defectors are more likely to become cooperators with fast
link adaptation. However, this tendency does not reach
the reversal of ρC and ρP . Last, panel (b) shows that the
large cost of implementing punishment (γ = 0.5) amplifies
the abundance of cooperators as expected.
The analysis has so far assumed that the network has
low density. Here we examine different cases by varying
the average degree (〈k〉 ). Panel (a) of fig. 7 reports the
results without link adaptation. In the typical standard
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(a) γ = 0 (b) γ = 0.5
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Fig. 6: Proportions of cooperators and punishers (ρC and ρP )
as a function of the fine of punishment (α) for the different
cost of punishment (γ). With fast link adaptation, coopera-
tors achieve a larger frequency than do punishers without the
cost of punishment, and this difference becomes larger with the
cost becoming positive. Parameters: N = 50000, 〈k〉 = 8, b =
1.3, w = 0.8, β = 0.1, µ = 0.005.
prisoner’s dilemma games on the network, a large degree
makes it difficult to form the cluster of cooperators and
deteriorates cooperation. The same pattern is observed
when the punishment strategy is appended and a large
average degree deteriorates the cooperators and punish-
ers. Panel (b) reports the results with link adaptation.
The pattern that cooperators achieve a larger frequency
than do punishers is confirmed again when 〈k〉 is small.
However, a larger 〈k〉 supports defectors, and cooperators
and punishers decrease their frequency simultaneously.
Last, we consider the case where the fine of punish-
ment is larger than the temptation to defect (b − α < 0)
and defectors prefer interactions with defectors over those
with punishers. Figure 8 reports the resultant frequency
of each strategy as a function of w when punishment is
strong. The pattern that was observed in Panel (a) of
fig. 2 is replicated: punishers are required when w is small,
whereas cooperators achieve a larger frequency when w is
large. Although focal defectors prefer interactions with de-
fectors over those with punishers, cooperators remain the
most preferred interaction partner. Consequently, cooper-
ators still have a large number of opportunities to enforce
their strategy on defectors when w is large.
Discussion. – In this paper, we examined the evo-
lutionary PDG with punishment and partner switching.
Our simulation results showed that harsh punishment can
suppress the proliferation of defectors even when the fre-
quency of partner switching is low. Defectors also dimin-
ish in frequency when the frequency of partner switching
is high, and cooperators outperform punishers in this sit-
uation. The advantage of cooperators in this situation is
not derived from the fact that they do not incur the cost of
punishment and acquire larger average payoff per game.
In well-mixed populations or on the static network, co-
operators are just second-order free-riders. With oppor-
tunities for partner switching, however, defectors try to
sever their relationship with punishers and make connec-
tions with cooperators. This network evolution diminishes
cooperators’ payoff advantage over punishers. The advan-
tage for cooperators results from the fact that they have
0.0
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Fig. 7: Proportions of cooperators and punishers (ρC and ρP )
as a function of the average degree (〈k〉). Cooperators and
punishers decrease their frequency simultaneously with larger
〈k〉. Average of 100 simulations is reported when (〈k〉, α, w) =
(32, 0.24, 0). Parameters: N = 50000, b = 1.05, γ = 0.05, β =
0.1, µ = 0.005.
more opportunities to enforce their strategy on defectors,
thereby increasing the frequency of cooperators in their
neighbourhood.
Our results showed that the abundance of each strategy
in social dilemma differs depending on the frequency of
partner switching. This fact suggests that the fluidity of
social relationships has a profound effect on what strategy
is favoured in the evolutionary process. A simple coopera-
tion strategy is favoured with a high level of social fluidity,
whereas the punishment strategy is favoured in the soci-
ety with fixed social relationships. In addition, our model
suggests that the normative distinction between punish-
ers and second-order free-riders is not so clear because
punishers can avoid interactions with defectors. This ob-
servation might be related to the fact that punishers do
not necessarily enjoy positive reputations [54].
Although our model builds on the understanding of the
combined effect of partner switching and punishment, fur-
ther analysis is warranted. For example, anti-social pun-
ishment is indicated as another obstacle to the evolution
of cooperation (punishment) [55] and an investigation into
its effects may be required. In addition, adding a reward
mechanism [56] may lead to an interesting pattern. Fur-
thermore, since the number of opportunities to enforce the
strategy played a large role in the model, introducing other
rules of strategy updating may be required [57–59]. We
believe that this line of research will further deepen our
understanding of the evolutionary origin of cooperation.
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